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NOTES
MISCHIEF MANAGED? THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEC ALJS UNDER
THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Jackson C. Blais*
INTRODUCTION
Since Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946
(APA),1 the administrative state has expanded exponentially. Today, federal
agencies are critical players in the administrative scheme due to their role in
establishing and enforcing regulations.2 An important part within this system is played by Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”).3 In 2016, the Tenth
Circuit4 and the D.C. Circuit5 took up the question of whether ALJs of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were hired in accordance with
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The two courts came to opposite conclusions—the Tenth Circuit concluded that SEC ALJs are inferior
officers, and as a result, do not comport with the Appointments Clause,6
whereas the D.C. Circuit determined that the SEC ALJs are employees, and
so do not run afoul of the Constitution.7 Though similar claims have been
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Grinnell College, 2016. Thanks to Professor Patricia Bellia for her
valuable comments and advice through every step of this process. I am incredibly grateful
to my friends and family for their constant support, and to the Notre Dame Law Review staff.
Special thanks to my dad for his thoughtful edits and for exemplifying the qualities of the
lawyer that I aspire to be. All errors are my own.
1 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
2 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 332 (2d ed. 2013).
3 See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 798–800 (2013)
(noting that ALJs decide over 250,000 cases per year and parallel the function of Article III
judges).
4 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
5 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 736 (2018).
6 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179.
7 See Lucia, 832 F.3d at 289.
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made, other circuit courts have not yet decided this argument on the merits.8
Nevertheless, the Tenth and D.C. Circuits have created a split that the
Supreme Court will answer by the end of this term9—whether SEC ALJs comport with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Answering this question will at least indirectly implicate other agencies’ ALJs because of their
similar duties.
This Note argues that SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States
and, as a result, are unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause. Part I
examines the current state of ALJs and the jurisprudence of the Appointments Clause. Part II provides an analysis of the circuit split between the
Tenth and D.C. Circuits over the question of SEC ALJs and the Appointments Clause. Part III argues that the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC correctly decided the question presented. This Part further urges the Supreme
Court to reverse the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Lucia and, in so doing, adhere
to its correctly decided past doctrine, notwithstanding the potential ramifications for the administrative state.
I. BACKGROUND

ON

ALJS

AND THE

APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

A. ALJs
Each federal agency is authorized to employ ALJs, the number of which
varies according to each agency’s need.10 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) manages the application and hiring process of ALJs for all
agencies,11 though the OPM does not actually select which candidates are
chosen to become ALJs.12 Some agencies do not hire or utilize ALJs whatsoever,13 but other agencies employ hundreds or even thousands of ALJs.14
Though their number varies, ALJs perform an extensive array of duties in
8 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171 n.2 (providing citations to other circuit cases in
which the court rejected arguments challenging the constitutionality of SEC ALJs due to
failure to “raise and exhaust the argument in the administrative proceedings”); see, e.g.,
Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 278–79
(2d Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015).
9 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012) (empowering agencies to “appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings required” by the APA).
11 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2017).
12 See id. § 930.201(e) (“OPM does not hire administrative law judges for other agencies . . . .”); id. § 930.204(a) (noting that “an agency may appoint” an ALJ, rather than the
OPM (emphasis added)).
13 See ALJs by Agency, OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) [hereinafter OPM Table of ALJs] (identifying that the Commodities Future Trading Commission,
Merit Systems Protection Board, and Small Business Administration do not presently have
an ALJ).
14 See id. (specifically, the Department of Health and Human Services currently has
over one hundred ALJs, while the Social Security Administration currently has 1655 ALJs).
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accordance with sections 553 and 554 of the APA.15 In essence, ALJs hold
hearings in each agency and occupy a quasi-judicial role.16 Within the
administrative framework, ALJs make decisions that may be appealed up to
the agency’s leadership, whose decision can then be appealed to the federal
court system.17
SEC ALJs, like other ALJs, “serve as independent adjudicators.”18 Currently, they are hired by the Chief ALJ of the SEC,19 who receives potential
nominees from the OPM. SEC ALJs conduct public hearings and issue decisions based on those hearings.20 The SEC Commission always has the discretionary power to review an SEC ALJ’s decision, and sometimes has a
mandatory duty to review should a party from the SEC ALJ’s decision seek an
appeal.21 If the SEC Commission does not take up an SEC ALJ’s decision,
the SEC ALJ’s decision becomes final.22
B. Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution reads as follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
15 See 5 U.S.C. § 556–57; see, e.g., MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 2, at 546–49
(explaining how ALJs operate within the APA’s statutory framework).
16 The Office of Personnel Management describes the “Major Duties” of ALJs as
follows:
ALJs conduct formal hearings involving cases where all interested parties are
given advance notice of the hearing; an opportunity to submit facts, arguments,
offers of settlement or proposals of adjustment; and an opportunity to be . . .
represented[ ] and advised by counsel . . . . ALJs rule on preliminary motions,
conduct pre-hearing conferences, issue subpoenas, control hearings . . . review
briefs, and prepare and issue initial or recommended decisions, along with written findings of fact and conclusions of law therein. Oral or documentary evidence may be received, but irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence
is excluded. Decisions are issued upon consideration of the whole record, or
those parts of it cited by a party and supported by and in accord with reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.
Administrative Law Judges, OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=Fact-Sheet (last visited Nov. 24, 2017).
17 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 2, at 546.
18 Office of Administrative Law Judges, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/alj (last modified Jan.
26, 2017).
19 Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 3, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (Feb. 21,
2018), 2018 WL 1251862.
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (2017); see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2016); OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 16. For an extensive list of duties and powers that SEC ALJs are able to exercise in the course of a hearing, see Bandimere, 844 F.3d at
1178.
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b) (2012); see also Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277,
281 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c). In so doing, the ALJ’s finding is considered to “be deemed
the action of the Commission.” Id.
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Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.23

The Appointments Clause lays out a framework that maintains a separation of powers among the governmental branches by blending the branches’
powers and creating checks and balances. For example, the President is
given the ability to nominate principal officers,24 whereas Congress is given
the power to choose whether the President, a court, or the head of a department may appoint inferior officers.25 Furthermore, principal officers are
subject to “Advice and Consent of the Senate,” which provides an additional
check on the Executive’s discretion.26 This appointments framework,
though not always clear,27 or strictly interpreted,28 has nevertheless ossified
into a workable standard.29
Most caselaw concerning the Appointments Clause revolves around the
distinction between principal and inferior officers.30 The Appointments
Clause does not precisely define what designates an officer as inferior, nor
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24 The Constitution does not explicitly establish the principal officer position—the
Court has determined that the labeling of “inferior officers” in the Appointments Clause
implicitly creates the principal officer distinction. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 190 (7th ed. 2016).
25 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
26 Id.
27 For example, the Appointments Clause does not mention how officers may be
removed from their positions. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is, of course, no provision in the Constitution stating who
may remove executive officers, except the provisions for removal by impeachment.”). The
question of officer removal has spawned its own line of caselaw that often commingles with
Appointments Clause issues, but Bandimere and Lucia did not directly address the issue of
the removal of SEC ALJs.
28 See Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 467, 484 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the
Appointments Clause “somewhat inconsistent[ly]” with a strict understanding of separation of powers).
29 See id. (“[O]nce [the Supreme Court] arrives at an interpretation [of the Appointments Clause], it is not forgiving if it finds that the provision has been violated.”). But see
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (Apr. 23, 2018) (Justice
Breyer describing the Appointments Clause caselaw as a “contradictory mess”).
30 See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (“Whether one is an
‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior. . . . [W]e think it evident that
‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72 (listing four factors to discern whether an official is a
principal or inferior officer); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (“Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads
of departments, or by the Judiciary.”).
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does it mention government employees. If an official is designated as an
employee, as opposed to an officer, she need not comport with the Appointments Clause.31 Since most Appointments Clause jurisprudence concerns
the difference between inferior and principal officers, the distinction
between inferior officers and employees has received far less attention. For
example, the Court in dicta has briefly mentioned that an employee of the
United States is simply a “lesser functionar[y] subordinate to officers of the
United States.”32
The Supreme Court’s primary case concerning the definitions of inferior officers and employees is Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Special Trial Judges (“STJs”)
appointed by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court.33 Freytag
focused on whether the Tax Court, under the Appointments Clause, had the
authority to appoint STJs.34 This necessarily required the Court to answer
the threshold question of whether an STJ was an inferior officer or an
employee.35
For the purposes of this Note, the Court determined that an STJ was an
inferior officer.36 In so finding, the Court relied on three factors: (1) that
the office of STJs is “established by law,” (2) that the “duties, salary, and
31 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“[Employees] need not be selected in
compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
32 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162; see also Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 326–27
(1890) (holding that a merchant appraiser was not an inferior officer because he was
“selected for [a] particular case”; the “position [was] without tenure, duration, continuing
emolument, or continuous duties, and he act[ed] only occasionally and temporarily,”
“[t]herefore, he [was] not an ‘officer,’ within the meaning of the [Appointments
Clause]”); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878) (determining that a
surgeon was not an officer because his duties were “not continuing and permanent, and
[were] occasional and intermittent”; the Court considered the nature of the surgeon’s
“tenure, duration, emolument, and duties” in deciding whether the surgeon was an
officer).
33 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870–71; see Linda D. Jellum & Moses M. Tincher, The Shadow of
Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission’s Administrative Law Judges, 70 SMU L. REV. 3, 20 (2017) (noting the difference between an officer and
an employee is whether the official in question “exercise[s] significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States” and that though “[n]o one factor is determinative” courts
consider collectively “the manner in which Congress created the position, the appointment
process, the responsibilities of the position, the tenure and duration of the position, the
amount and manner of pay, the level of supervision, and the identity of the supervisor”);
Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 233, 262 n.248 (2008) (identifying sources that question whether the Freytag
decision that the STJ at issue was an employee was assumed by all the Justices).
34 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872 (identifying the issue as whether “the assignment of cases [by
the Tax Court] . . . to a special trial judge . . . violated the Appointments Clause”).
35 Id. at 880 (“If we . . . conclude that a special trial judge is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’ need not be selected in compliance
with the strict requirements of Article II.” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162)).
36 Id. at 881.
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means of appointment for that office are specified by statute,”37 and (3) that
an STJ carried out “important functions” while exercising “significant discretion.”38 The IRS Commissioner argued that STJs were employees because
they could not enter a final decision, but the Court rejected this notion by
identifying the STJs’ significant duties and discretion as proof that STJs were
in actuality inferior officers.39
II. LUCIA

AND

BANDIMERE

The facts of the circuit split cases, Lucia and Bandimere, are roughly analogous—both involve the SEC bringing an administrative enforcement action
against Lucia and Bandimere for alleged violations of various securities
laws.40 In both cases, the SEC ALJs presiding over the hearing found the
defendants liable and imposed various penalties upon them.41 In their
appeals, Lucia and Bandimere argued inter alia that because the Chief ALJ
who hired the SEC ALJs was not the Head of a Department, the SEC ALJs
were hired in violation of the Appointments Clause—as a result, the judgments made by the ALJs could not stand.42 The ALJs in both cases unsurprisingly found themselves to be employees, which the SEC Commission
subsequently affirmed.43
A. The D.C. Circuit in Lucia
In Lucia, the D.C. Circuit unanimously held that SEC ALJs are employees and not inferior officers, so their hiring process does not run afoul of the
Constitution.44 The court noted that since SEC ALJs were not appointed in a
way that satisfies the Appointments Clause, the relevant question was whether
an SEC ALJ is an employee or not.45 Though it recognized the importance
37 Id.
38 Id. at 881–82.
39 See id. at 881–82 (noting the “significance of the duties and discretion that special
trial judges possess” and that when the STJ carried out “important functions, [the STJ]
exercise[d] significant discretion”).
40 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016); Raymond J. Lucia Cos.
v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
41 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171 (citing David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 507,
2013 WL 5553898, at *61–84 (ALJ Oct. 8, 2013)) (noting that the ALJ “barred [petitioner]
from the securities industry, ordered him to cease and desist from violating securities laws,
imposed civil penalties, and ordered disgorgement”); Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283 (citing Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Initial Decision Release No. 495, 2013 WL 3379719, at *42 (ALJ July 8,
2013)) (noting that the ALJ “impos[ed] sanctions, including a lifetime industry bar [on
Lucia]”).
42 David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, at *19–21 (Oct. 29,
2015); Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Release No. 75837, 2015 WL 5172953, at *21–24
(Sept. 3, 2015).
43 See supra note 41.
44 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 280.
45 Id. at 283 (“The Commission has acknowledged the ALJ was not appointed as the
Clause requires . . . . [and so] if the court concludes . . . that [SEC] ALJs are Officers within

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL511.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 7

mischief managed

18-JUL-18

7:17

2121

of Freytag, the court relied upon tests established by its own line of caselaw
post-Freytag to determine whether an appointee is a constitutional Officer.46
The court noted that SEC ALJs were “established by Law” and that an ALJ’s
“duties, salary and means of appointment” were specified by statute.47
The court, relying on its own precedent, then listed the “main criteria”
that determine whether an appointee is an employee or an inferior officer:
“(1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those
decisions.”48 According to the court, an official must meet each of these
criteria—that is, the official must resolve significant matters, exercise discretion in doing so, and their decisions must be final—in order to be considered an inferior official.49 The D.C. Circuit proceeded to reject Lucia’s
argument because an SEC ALJ’s decision is not considered final until the
SEC Commission issues a finality order.50 Though an SEC ALJ may exercise
discretion in deciding significant matters, the D.C. Circuit found that an SEC
ALJ has no power to bind anyone until the Commission has embraced the
ALJ’s decision as its own.51 Because SEC ALJs therefore lacked final decision-making power, the court held that SEC ALJs are employees and that
their hiring process does not violate the Appointments Clause.52
One year later, the court in an en banc memorandum opinion upheld
the decision, in an even 5–5 split vote.53 No judge wrote an opinion, so little
can be gleaned concerning the disagreements in the split. The split nevertheless indicates that the consensus among the D.C. Circuit judges is not as
strong as the original Lucia decision made it appear.
B. The Tenth Circuit in Bandimere
A few months after the D.C. Circuit passed down its Lucia decision, the
Tenth Circuit came to the conclusion that SEC ALJs are inferior officers and,
the meaning of the Appointments Clause, then the ALJ . . . was unconstitutionally
appointed . . . .”).
46 Id. at 284 (citing Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see also
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
47 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
48 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284 (quoting Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133).
49 See id. at 284–85.
50 See id. at 286 (“[T]he initial decision becomes final when, and only when, the Commission issues the finality order, and not before then . . . . [T]he Commission must affirmatively act . . . in every case.”).
51 See id. at 288.
52 See id. at 289. The remainder of the case consisted of the court upholding the
Commission’s findings against Lucia and denying his petition for review. Id. at 289–96.
53 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Chief Judge Merrick
Garland did not vote in the matter, leaving the court in an even split. Id. at 1021 n.*; see
also Cogan Schneier, DC Circuit Split Tees Up Supreme Court Review of SEC Judges, NAT’L L.J.
(June 26, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202791407100/DC-Circuit-SplitTees-Up-Supreme-Court-Review-of-SEC-Judges (noting that Chief Judge Garland recused
himself from the en banc hearing and decision).
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as such, are unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause in a divided
opinion. The Bandimere court first noted the various definitions of inferior
officers,54 and included a list of fifteen positions that the Supreme Court had
determined to be inferior officers from 1839 up until 1997.55 Unlike the
D.C. Circuit, which had its own caselaw on the issue of defining an inferior
officer, the Tenth Circuit relied entirely upon Freytag for its determination.56
The Tenth Circuit gleaned a three-factor test from Freytag to determine
whether an official was an employee or an inferior officer: (1) whether the
position was “established by Law,”57 (2) whether “the duties, salary, and
means of appointment” of the official are “specified by statute,”58 and (3)
whether the official “ ‘exercise[d] significant discretion’ in ‘carrying out . . .
important functions.’ ”59
54 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2016). The court quoted
Justice Breyer, who noted the difficulty in defining inferior officers:
Inferior officers are, inter alia, (1) those charged with “the administration and
enforcement of the public law,” (2) those granted “significant authority,” (3)
those with “responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States,” and (4) those “who can be said to hold an office,” that has been
created either by “regulations” or by “statute.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
55 See id. at 1173–74; see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666 (1997) (military judge); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (Tax Court special trial
judges); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (independent counsel); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (Federal Election Commission commissioners);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352 (1931) (United States commissioner in district court proceedings); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 173–74 (1926)
(postmaster first class); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (extradition commissioners); United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (vice consul “charged with the duty
of temporarily performing the functions” of consul); United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591,
595 (1895) (commissioner of the circuit court); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484
(1886) (engineer appointed by Secretary of the Navy); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397
(1879) (federal marshal); id. at 398 (election supervisor); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878) (“clerks in the Department of the Treasury, Interior,” and other
departments); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 761–62 (1877) (assistant surgeon); In re
Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839) (district court clerk). It should be recognized that the
Court has struggled to maintain, or even recognize, a consistent definition of an inferior
officer. See Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause,
Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1545 (1990) (arguing that the
inferior officer cases that do exist “posit conclusions rather than arguments and provide
little insight to justify their results”). However, the cases provided for in this footnote are
meant to indicate the sorts of positions and officials that the Court has found to be inferior
officials, not to establish a definition that distinguishes between an inferior officer and an
employee.
56 See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1174 (recognizing that “the Freytag opinion provides the
guidance needed,” and that “Freytag controls the result of this case”).
57 Id. at 1179 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881).
58 Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881).
59 Id. at 1179 (second alteration in original) (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882). Examples of important functions that required significant discretion include, “tak[ing] testi-
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The SEC argued that because the SEC ALJ could not render final decisions (whereas the STJ in Freytag sometimes could), the ALJ at issue here was
an employee.60 The SEC pointed to the D.C. Circuit’s caselaw, including the
recently decided Lucia case, because the D.C. Circuit was the only circuit
court to have decided the SEC ALJ status question, but the Tenth Circuit
rejected this reasoning.61 The Tenth Circuit determined that the D.C. Circuit’s requirement that an inferior officer must have final decision-making
authority departed from the Freytag holding.62 Rather, final decision-making
authority is a factor, but is not determinative when deciding whether an official utilized significant authority.63
The court then concluded that SEC ALJs met the third criterion of the
Freytag test—that SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion while performing
important functions.64 This conclusion was reinforced by the similarities
between the STJ’s position in Freytag with the SEC ALJ, which will be discussed further in Part III.65
Judge Briscoe concurred in full and wrote separately to address more
fully Judge McKay’s dissent.66 In particular, the concurrence chided the dissent for suggesting that the court had destabilized the ALJ system,67 and
more clearly rejected the D.C. Circuit’s line of caselaw.68 The Bandimere concurrence provides additional and helpful analysis for answering the inferior
officer/employee question, which will be further examined in Part III below.
In so doing, Part III will also more closely analyze Judge McKay’s dissent in
Bandimere.
The SEC petitioned for an en banc hearing, but the Tenth Circuit voted
9–2 to deny the rehearing.69 Judge Lucero wrote a dissent from the denial,
arguing that the court ought to give stronger deference to the Supreme
mony, conduct[ing] trials, rul[ing] on the admissibility of evidence, and hav[ing] the
power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82.
60 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1182.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1182–83 (“[The] conclusion [in Freytag] did not depend on the STJs’ authority to make final decisions.”).
63 See id. at 1183–84 (“[T]he Court [in Freytag] did not make final decision-making
power the essence of inferior officer status.”).
64 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
65 Compare Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82 (noting that STJs “conduct trials, rule on the
admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders”), with Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179–81 (identifying the authorities of SEC ALJs
which include “taking testimony, regulating document production and depositions, ruling
on the admissibility of evidence, receiving evidence, ruling on dispositive and procedural
motions, issuing subpoenas, . . . presiding over trial-like hearings[,] . . . impos[ing] sanctions[,] . . . [and the] power to enter default judgments” (footnotes omitted)).
66 Id. at 1188 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 1188–1191.
68 Id. at 1191 (arguing that relying on final decision-making authority, as the D.C.
Circuit had done, “is wrong”).
69 Bandimere v. SEC, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017).
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Court on the question at issue,70 particularly in light of the consequences
such a holding would have on the independence of ALJs.71 In the following
analysis in Part III, both Judge McKay and Judge Lucero’s dissents will be
considered in tandem, as the two opinions make similar arguments.
III. ANALYSIS

AND

ARGUMENT

A. Analyzing Lucia and Bandimere Under Freytag
Freytag is the controlling Supreme Court case concerning the distinction
between inferior officers and employees. An inferior officer’s position must
be “established by Law,” and have their duties, salaries, and means of
appointment specified by statute.72 Additionally, the officer must “carry[ ]
out . . . important functions” by exercising “significant discretion.”73
Both courts in Lucia and Bandimere recognized that SEC ALJs satisfied
the first and second requirements set out by Freytag.74 The main conflict
between the two courts, then, was the issue of the third requirement—determining how and when an official carries out “important functions” while
exercising “significant discretion.”75 Where Bandimere attempted to follow
the standard set forth by Freytag, the D.C. Circuit in Lucia split the final
Freytag requirement into more factors that were based on the court’s earlier
decision in Tucker v. Commissioner.76 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit deviated
from Freytag in reading its precedent to require that an inferior officer must
have final decision-making power. This requirement runs directly against
Freytag, and so the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that SEC ALJs are employees
must be rejected.
The D.C. Circuit’s conclusions relied heavily upon two cases it had
decided since the Supreme Court handed down the Freytag decision: Tucker
and Landry.77 Landry determined that the Freytag Court had relied upon
“the STJs’ power of final decision in certain classes of cases” in concluding
70 See id. at 1130–31 (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“In
light of the very real and substantial consequences, labeling SEC ALJs ‘inferior officers’ for
the first time in the near-century of their existence should not be done without a clear
mandate from the Supreme Court.”).
71 See id. at 1132 (“[O]n a fundamental level, the consequence of this decision—providing agency heads with the sole power to appoint ALJs of their choosing—threatens the
integrity of the ALJ office.”).
72 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
73 Id. at 882.
74 The first requirement is that the office be “established by Law.” Id. at 881 (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). The second is that the “duties, salar[ies], and means of
appointment for that office are specified by statute.” Id.
75 Id. at 881–82.
76 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138
S. Ct. 736 (2018); Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
77 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 832 F.3d at 284–85 (first citing Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133;
and then citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
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STJs were inferior officers.78 Tucker further expounded on this determination by listing three factors to parse out the third criterion of the Freytag test:
“(1) the significance of the matters resolved by the official[ ], (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those
decisions.”79 Tucker recognized that the STJs in Freytag did not always render
final decisions, but also noted that the D.C. Circuit in Landry had found that
ALJs were employees because they lacked authority to render final decisions.80 The Tucker court further pointed out that the official at issue in
Tucker had little discretion,81 and was subject to many limitations, guidelines,
and consultations.82
Lucia’s reliance on the SEC ALJs’ lack of final decision-making authority, however, departs significantly from Freytag. The Lucia court justified its
reliance on final decision-making authority upon the fact that the Freytag
STJs could exercise final decision-making authority under certain provisions
of the statutes that empowered the chief judge of the Tax Court to appoint
STJs.83
But the Freytag Court expressly rejected the argument that final decisionmaking authority was determinative in the inferior officer/employee question.84 The D.C. Circuit misread the requirements that Freytag set forth to
determine when an official is an inferior officer. The Court in Freytag
decided that STJs were inferior officers before considering the statutory subsections that gave STJs final decision-making authority.85 The granting of
final decision-making authority to STJs under certain circumstances bolstered the Court’s reasoning, but did not determine its conclusion. The
Court emphasized this, saying that “[e]ven if” STJs did not possess significant
duties when they did not possess final decision-making authority, the Court’s
78 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134.
79 Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.
80 See id. at 1134 (“[W]e found the absence of any authority to render final decisions
fatal to the claim that the administrative law judges at issue [in Landry] were Officers
rather than employees.” (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34)). The ALJs in Landry were
from the FDIC, rather than the SEC. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128.
81 The official in question in Tucker was a “settlement officer” who represented the IRS
during a Collection Due Process Hearing. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1131.
82 See id. at 1134–35.
83 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (“Under §§ 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3),
and (c), the Chief Judge may assign special trial judges to render the decisions of the Tax
Court in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases. The Commissioner concedes that in cases governed by [these subsections], [STJs] act as inferior
officers who exercise independent authority.”).
84 See id. at 881 (“The Commissioner reasons that [STJs] may be deemed employees . . . because they lack authority to enter a final decision. But this argument ignores the
significance of the duties and discretion that [STJs] possess.”).
85 See id. at 881–82; see, e.g., Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“It is true that the Supreme Court [in Freytag] relied on
[final decision-making authority] . . . . What the [Landry] majority neglects to mention is
that the [Freytag] Court clearly designated this as an alternative holding.”).
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“conclusion would be unchanged.”86 This suggests that if the statutory and
regulatory subsections that granted STJs final decision-making authorities did
not exist, the Court still would have found that STJs were inferior officers
because they exercised significant authority and discretion. Thus, Freytag
held that final decision-making authority cannot be a controlling factor in
whether STJs are inferior officers—the Court instead looked to whether the
STJs more generally exercised significant discretion in carrying out important functions.
In contrast, Bandimere properly applied the Freytag test by not giving final
decision-making authority outsized weight in its determination.87 The Tenth
Circuit determined that Freytag required a determination of which functions
and discretions were significant and important to merit a finding that SEC
ALJs are inferior officers. The dissent critiqued the majority for listing out a
number of the duties of SEC ALJs “without telling us which, if any, were more
important to its decision than others and why.”88 This accusation, however,
is misleading.
The Bandimere court did present a lengthy table listing out the duties of
SEC ALJs and the corresponding regulation or statute that gives the ALJs
those duties.89 The list of duties showed that “SEC ALJs perform comparable
duties” to the STJs that were at issue in Freytag.90 However, the court proceeded to identify those duties from the list that convinced the court that
SEC ALJs are inferior officers.91 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit highlighted
four duties that the Freytag Court named in determining that STJs are inferior officers: “They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of
evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders.”92 SEC ALJs perform each of these duties in their legal capacity.93
86 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).
87 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1176–82 (10th Cir. 2016).
88 Id. at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 1178 (majority opinion).
90 Id. at 1181 n.30.
91 See id. at 1179–81 (listing important duties and concluding that “[i]n sum, SEC ALJs
closely resemble the STJs described in Freytag”).
92 See id. at 1181 n.30 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82). The Fifth Circuit recently
issued an order to stay a motion set forth by the FDIC Board because the court determined
the petitioner had a strong likelihood that he would prevail on his claim that the FDIC ALJ
holds his office in violation of the Appointments Clause. See Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297,
299 (5th Cir. 2017). The Fifth Circuit identified the four factors Freytag used in categorizing the STJ as an inferior officer and recognized that “FDIC ALJs perform all of these
functions.” Id. at 302.
93 For an SEC ALJ’s duties of taking testimony, see 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012) (identifying that an ALJ must preside over an administrative hearing); § 556(c)(4) (noting than an
ALJ is empowered to “take depositions”). For conducting trials, see § 556(b) (noting that
the ALJ’s presiding takes place over “the taking of evidence”); 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (2017)
(noting that “the Office of Administrative Law Judges conducts hearings in proceedings
instituted by the Commission” and then going on to list eight different duties that fall
under this power to conduct trials). For ruling on the admissibility of evidence, see 5
U.S.C. § 556(c)(3) (giving the power to “rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evi-
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Thus, Bandimere correctly synthesized the third criterion of Freytag to mean
that an official exercises significant discretion in carrying out important functions when the official (1) takes testimony, (2) conducts trials, (3) makes
rulings on evidence, and (4) is able to enforce discovery orders.94 This is the
proper test for analyzing the classification of SEC ALJs, as it represents the
core of the Freytag determination without any additional or unnecessary
requirements.
B. Revisiting Freytag
All of the foregoing analysis assumes that the Supreme Court will
address the SEC ALJ circuit split on the grounds that Bandimere and Lucia
established. It is assumed that the Court will accept Freytag on its terms.
Appointments Clause issues, however, do not often come before the Court,
and even rarer are the cases that squarely confront the question of distinguishing inferior officers from employees.95
Freytag only dedicated six paragraphs to address the inferior officer/
employee distinction.96 As the Lucia and Bandimere opinions reveal, Freytag
essentially is the only Supreme Court case on point for the courts to use in
deciding these cases.97 But the Supreme Court has shown that, particularly
in Appointments Clause jurisprudence, it is not necessarily constrained by
past precedent.
1. The Supreme Court’s Habit of Disregarding Appointments Clause
Precedent
Consider Morrison v. Olson98 and Edmond v. United States,99 both cases in
which the Supreme Court set out to determine whether an official was a principal or inferior officer.100 Morrison set out a four-factor test to answer this
question: (1) whether the official is inferior in terms of “rank and authordence” to ALJs); 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a)(3) (similarly giving the power to “[r]ule on offers of
proof” specifically to SEC ALJs). For the power to enforce compliance with discovery
orders, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.230, 201.233.
94 The Fifth Circuit likewise identified these four factors as the foundation of Freytag’s
test to determine whether an official exercises significant discretion in carrying out important duties. See, e.g., Burgess, 871 F.3d at 302.
95 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
96 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880–82.
97 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Freytag controls the
result of this case.”); Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (noting that the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases, Landry and
Tucker, based their holdings off of Freytag).
98 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
99 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
100 Specifically, Morrison determined that an independent counsel was an inferior
officer. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. Edmond held that a civilian judge on the Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals was an inferior officer. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666.
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ity,”101 (2) the duties the officer is tasked with performing,102 (3) the official’s jurisdiction,103 and (4) the official’s tenure.104 The Court believed that
the independent counsel at issue “clearly” fell into the inferior officer category105—a notion that Justice Scalia, in a lone dissent, vigorously disputed.106 Justice Scalia proposed an alternative test: whether the official in
question is subordinate to any executive officer.107 Justice Scalia based this
test on the general dictionary definition of “inferiour” from the time of the
Constitutional Convention, and argued that given that the Constitution creates the structure of the federal government, the use of “inferior” in Article
III, Section 1 would have been understood to mean subordinate.108
Nine years later, the Court again addressed the principal/inferior distinction in Edmond v. United States. Justice Scalia, the lone dissent in Morrison,
wrote for the Court in finding that a judge on the Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals was an inferior officer.109 Although the Court acknowledged the four-factor test used in Morrison, the Court effectively pushed that
test aside because Morrison “did not purport to set forth a definitive test” for
the principal/inferior distinction.110 Instead, the Court shifted toward the
approach proposed by Justice Scalia in his Morrison dissent, holding that an
officer is inferior when her work “is directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”111
Though the Court did not explicitly say so, Edmond effectively threw the
Morrison holding into serious question.112 Although Appointments Clause
101 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671 (“[T]he fact that [the independent counsel] can be
removed by the Attorney General indicates that she is to some degree ‘inferior’ in rank
and authority.”).
102 See id. (noting that the “independent counsel’s role is restricted primarily to investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution for certain federal crimes,” even though the counsel was also granted full function and power of the Justice Department).
103 See id. at 672 (“[A]n independent counsel can only act within the scope of the jurisdiction that has been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the Attorney
General.”).
104 See id. (“[A]n independent counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single
task, and when that task is over the office is terminated . . . . [The independent counsel]
has no ongoing responsibilities that extend beyond . . . the mission that she was appointed
for and authorized by the Special Division to undertake.”).
105 Id. at 671.
106 See id. at 715–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear from the Court’s opinion
why the factors it discusses—even if applied correctly to the facts of this case—are determinative of the question of inferior officer status.”).
107 See id. at 719.
108 See id. at 719–20.
109 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666 (1997).
110 Id. at 661.
111 Id. at 663.
112 See William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent
Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1258 (1999) (arguing that Edmond’s “analysis plainly
was inconsistent” with Morrison).
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cases are few in number, the Court notably cited Edmond and not Morrison in
reciting the Court’s jurisprudence on the principal/inferior determination
in Free Enterprise Fund.113
2.

Freytag Does Not Require a Reframing

The comparison between Morrison and Edmond shows that the Court has
been willing to depart from, or even functionally ignore, past precedent in
the Appointments Clause context. Since the caselaw is so sparse, the Court
may not necessarily feel compelled to follow apparent precedent that is difficult to apply to the facts of a case. Indeed, reviewing past Supreme Court
Appointments Clause cases reveals no clear interpretative through line.114
Although the D.C. and Tenth Circuits purported to apply Freytag, the
Supreme Court may determine that the Freytag requirements are not suitable
to resolve the SEC ALJ question, and may then establish or develop a new or
updated test. However, the Court should not do so, as Freytag currently provides a test that is sufficient to resolve the SEC ALJ issue.
The bulk of Freytag examines whether the Tax Court is the head of a
department or a court for purposes of appointing an inferior officer, rather
than the inferior officer/employee distinction.115 One could argue that the
Freytag test presents too limited a paradigm, and that the Court should start
afresh in establishing a clearer test. It is entirely possible that the Court,
confronted with the possibility that the status of thousands of ALJs may be
thrown into chaos by a proper application of Freytag, would reshape the
Freytag test in favor of a different interpretation, as the test may be difficult to
apply to future instances of the inferior officer/employee distinction.116
Edmond appeared to wholly disregard the four-factor test set forth by
Morrison, but a similar approach to Freytag is unnecessary. While the inferior
officer/employee distinction may require adjustments or modifications in
future disputes, Freytag sufficiently answers the SEC ALJ issue at hand. Even
the parties in Freytag recognized that distinguishing inferior officers from
employees requires an examination of the level of authority an official exer113 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510
(2010).
114 See Susolik, supra note 55, at 1545.
115 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880–82 (1991) (devoting only six paragraphs
to determine that STJs are inferior officers).
116 In Free Enterprise Fund, Justice Breyer, in dissent, provided a list of officials who could
be considered inferior officers. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S at 549–56 app. A (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Although the list of officials was intended to show how far the Court’s holding
regarding certain “double for-cause” removal provisions could extend, the list includes
many examples of officials who may be properly considered inferior officers, but who are
not similar to SEC ALJs. Id. These officials are not necessarily judicial or quasi-judicial,
and so the Freytag factors may be difficult to apply. Examples include the Chief Actuary of
the Social Security Administration, the members of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals,
and the Inspector General of the Postal Service. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL511.txt

2130

unknown

Seq: 16

notre dame law review

18-JUL-18

7:17

[vol. 93:5

cises while performing her duties.117 The analysis has consistently focused
on what constitutes “significant authority,” and there appears to be no indication that the Freytag framework, which is in part based on Buckley v. Valeo,
should be seriously questioned.118 If the Court were to try and rework the
inferior officer/employee test, it would require distinguishing at least Buckley
and Freytag, which have formed the admittedly small number of cases that
have applied the “significant authority” test.
The Court should not consider refashioning a new standard out of
Freytag when it decides the SEC ALJ Appointments Clause issue. Replacing
the Freytag distinction would have enormous ramifications for litigation down
the line and would require the Court to attempt to solve a problem that has
not been directly presented to them.119 It is clear that the four functions of
Freytag STJs are similar to the SEC ALJs. The Freytag framework neatly fits the
contours of the SEC ALJ problem, so the Court should have no issue applying precedent.120 There will be future cases with different facts that may
invite the Court to clarify the Freytag holding if it encounters a challenge to
an official whose duties are not similar in kind to STJs and SEC ALJs. But
Bandimere and Lucia are not the proper forums for doing so. Rather, when
the Court decides Lucia v. SEC later this term, it should directly apply the
Freytag test and find SEC ALJs to be inferior officers.

117 See Brief for Petitioners at 27, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (No. 90-762)
(arguing that the Court’s “contemporary definition of an ‘officer’ for Appointments
Clause purposes” is whether the official “‘exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States’” (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1976) (per curiam))); Brief for the Respondent at 28, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868
(1991) (No. 90-762) (“[I]t is well settled that persons . . . whose authority is not significant
under the laws of the United States, are ‘lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the
United States.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 at 126 n.162)).
118 At oral argument in Freytag, Justice O’Connor asked counsel for the petitioner
whether the Court has “really gone into any depth in defining who is an inferior officer
and who is an employee.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868 (1991) (No. 90-762). Counsel responded that the “test [from Buckley] for an officer is
whether he exercises significant authority pursuant to the law.” Id. at 19. This assertion
went unchallenged by the Court. The government, represented by the current Chief Justice, John Roberts, did not directly address this question during its allotted time. See id. at
28–55.
119 The Court granted certiorari on the precise question of “[w]hether administrative
law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are Officers of the United States
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (No. 17-130).
120 One could argue that the Edmond Court’s quasi rejection of the Morrison framework
may have occurred in part because the official in Edmond, a military judge on the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, did not have duties or discretion analogous to those of
the official at issue in Morrison, an independent counsel. See Edmond v. United States, 520
U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (noting that the military judge did not meet two of the four Morrison
factors, suggesting that the adoption of the test in Edmond occurred in part because the
Morrison test did not properly address the relevant Appointments Clause issues).
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C. Consideration of the Normative Implications of Adopting
the Rationale of Bandimere
The SEC ALJ issue, just like every other legal issue that comes before
courts, does not exist in a vacuum. Should the Supreme Court find SEC ALJs
to be inferior officers, there will be consequences that echo beyond the precise status determination of SEC ALJs. Since this Note argues that SEC ALJs
are inferior officers, this Section is intended to more closely examine some of
the consequences such a finding would have. The potential ramifications of
recognizing SEC ALJs as inferior officers are important to consider. The constitutional requirements of the Appointments Clause, however, outweigh the
direst of warnings that finding SEC ALJs to be inferior officers will wreak
havoc on the administrative system.
1. Can (and Should) the Bandimere Holding Apply to Other Agencies’
ALJs?
Bandimere and Lucia did not claim to make any determination outside
the context of SEC ALJs, as neither court claimed to make a judgment as to
other agencies’ ALJs.121 Writing for the court in Bandimere, Judge Matheson
sidestepped this issue because the court was only asked to address the precise
issue of the status of SEC ALJs.122 Judge Briscoe’s concurrence briefly
addressed the concerns of Judge McKay’s dissent, reiterating that because
courts only decide issues on a case-by-case basis, the Bandimere decision does
not affect any ALJ besides SEC ALJs.123 Although Judge Briscoe correctly
noted that not all ALJs necessarily have the same ability to exercise authority
as SEC ALJs,124 the next logical step is to consider how this decision could
affect other ALJs. The Bandimere dissents125 make clear that the questionable
constitutionality of other agencies’ ALJs is the elephant in the room.126 The
121 As previously noted, the potential implications for other ALJs did play a large role in
the Bandimere dissent. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1199–200 (10th Cir. 2016)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (“Are all federal ALJs constitutional officers? . . . [Social Security
Administration] ALJs have largely the same duties as SEC ALJs . . . . I cannot discern a
meaningful difference between SEC ALJs and SSA ALJs under the majority’s reading of
Freytag.”).
122 Id. at 1188 (majority opinion) (“[N]o other issues have been presented to us here,
and we therefore cannot address them. Nothing in this opinion should be read to answer
any but the precise question before this court: whether SEC ALJs are employees or inferior
officers. Questions about . . . officer status of other agencies’ ALJs . . . and retroactivity are
not issues on appeal and have not been briefed by the parties. . . . [W]e must leave for
another day any other putative consequences of that conclusion.” (citations omitted)).
123 See id. at 1188–89 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 1189 (“Some ALJs within particular agencies may exercise so little authority
and also be subject to such complete oversight . . . that they are not Officers.”).
125 In reference to both Judge McKay’s dissent in the original Bandimere decision and
Judge Lucero’s dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s denial to rehear Bandimere en banc.
126 See, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 855 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“By pulling on the Appointments Clause
thread, the majority opinion threatens to unravel much of our modern [day] regulatory
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Bandimere dissents were correct that the Bandimere holding would encourage
others to challenge the constitutionality of other ALJs,127 as litigants have
already begun to apply the Bandimere rationale to other ALJs, with some signs
of success.128
Though Bandimere properly declined to apply its holding to other agencies’ ALJs, it is appropriate to more closely examine how the four Freytag
factors would apply to other ALJs. At the very least, other agencies ought to
take notice that their ALJs may not have been appointed in compliance with
the Appointments Clause. Agencies of course could preemptively solve this
issue by formally ratifying the appointment of their ALJs.129 Before the
Supreme Court granted cert in Lucia, the SEC followed this procedure in
order to avoid a complete invalidation of the adjudications by their ALJs.130
If agencies do nothing, however, their ALJs may soon come into litigants’
crosshairs.
Bandimere provided four factors it had gleaned from the third prong of
the Freytag test in determining whether an official exercised significant discretion in carrying out important functions.131 The factors are whether an
official takes testimony, conducts trials, rules on the admissibility of evidence,
and has the ability to enforce compliance orders of discovery.132
As a starting point, the dissent in Bandimere noted that Social Security
Administration (SSA) ALJs bear a striking resemblance to SEC ALJs.133 The
dissent’s intent in comparing SSA ALJs to SEC ALJs was to show “that SEC
framework.”); Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll federal ALJs are
at risk of being declared inferior officers.”).
127 Bandimere, 855 F.3d at 1131 (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (“It is only a matter of time before we see broader challenges to the validity of
agency action.”).
128 See, e.g., Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017).
129 See, e.g., Jellum & Tincher, supra note 33, at 34 (suggesting that the SEC could take
the simple step by having the Commissioners, acting collectively as the head of a department, appoint the current SEC ALJs, thereby avoiding any Appointments Clause problem).
130 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN RE: PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (Nov. 30,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2017/33-10440.pdf (announcing that the
SEC “in its capacity as head of a department” ratifies the SEC’s hiring of its current ALJs).
The SEC may have taken this action in order to render the SEC ALJ issue moot, but the
Supreme Court still granted certiorari on the question despite the SEC’s order. See John
Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/
01/relist-watch-115/ (noting that the SEC had attempted to “depriv[e] the [Lucia] case[ ]
of continuing importance”). The government, which actually argued in support of Lucia in
front of the Supreme Court, asserted that the Commission’s certification of its ALJs solved
the Appointments Clause issue. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17130 (Apr. 23, 2018).
131 See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. But see Transcript of Oral Argument
at 11, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (Apr. 23, 2018) (identifying differences between SEC ALJs
and SSA ALJs).
132 See id.
133 See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
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ALJs are not unique”134 and that the holding of Bandimere would render “all
federal ALJs . . . at risk of being declared inferior officers.”135 In issuing dire
warnings, the dissent extrapolated the holding of the Tenth Circuit in a way
that Judges Matheson and Briscoe refused to do.136 Reading through the
doom and gloom predictions, the dissent’s comparison of SSA and SEC ALJs
provides a framework from which the question of other agencies’ ALJs’ status
can be squarely confronted.
Though this Note is not meant to be an exhaustive examination of each
of the thirty-one agencies’ ALJs,137 a brief survey of other agencies’ ALJs indicates that ALJs throughout the administrative state share many of the duties
and discretionary authority that Freytag and Bandimere suggest are indicative
of inferior officer status.138 SSA ALJs are able to take testimony,139 hold trials,140 rule on evidence,141 and enforce discovery orders,142 just like SEC

134 Id. at 1200.
135 Id. at 1199.
136 See id. at 1188 (“Nothing in this opinion should be read to answer any but the precise question before this court . . . .”); id. at 1189 (Briscoe, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts
engage in a case-by-case analysis.”).
137 See OPM Table of ALJs, supra note 13 (listing the thirty-one agencies that may
employ ALJs).
138 For example, ALJs of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may take testimony, conduct trials, rule on evidence, and may enforce discovery orders. See 18 C.F.R.
§§ 385.504(a)(1), 385.504(b)(1)–(3) (2018) (powers to hold trials); §§ 385.504(a)(2),
385.504(a)(4) (power to take testimony); § 385.504(b)(4) (granting ALJs the power to
“[r]ule on and receive evidence”); § 385.504(b)(5) (ensure discovery is conducted);
§ 385.504(b)(18). Another example is the ALJ position for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. See 24 C.F.R. § 26.32 (2018) (“The ALJ shall conduct a fair and
impartial hearing.”); § 26.32(g) (regulate discovery); § 26.32(i) (take testimony);
§ 26.32(j) (rule on and limit the taking of evidence). Even the lone ALJ for the United
States Postal Service meets the four Freytag characteristics. See 39 C.F.R. § 952.17(a) (2018)
(conduct a hearing); § 952.17(b)(2) (take testimony); § 952.17(b)(3) (rule on evidence);
§§ 952.17(b)(12), 952.21 (regulate discovery).
139 See 20 C.F.R. § 498.204(b)(4) (2018) (giving SSA ALJs the power to “[a]dminister
oaths and affirmations”); § 498.204(b)(8) (“[r]egulat[ing] the course of the hearing and
the conduct of representatives, parties, and witnesses”); § 498.204(b)(9) (“[e]xamine
witnesses”).
140 See id. § 404.929 (recognizing that an administrative law judge will “conduct the
hearing” and that the ALJ “will issue a decision based on the preponderance of the evidence”); see also id. § 404.930.
141 See id. § 498.204(b)(10); see also id. §§ 404.935, 404.950.
142 See id. § 498.204(b)(5) (giving the ALJ the power to “[i]ssue subpoenas requiring
the attendance of witnesses at hearings and the production of documents”);
§ 498.204(b)(7) (granting the ALJ the power to “[r]egulate the scope and timing of documentary discovery”).
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ALJs.143 The Fifth Circuit has indicated that FDIC ALJs may be similarly situated as well.144
Bandimere cautioned that a determination of whether an agency’s ALJs
are inferior officers or employees must be found through separate litigation.145 Not all ALJs necessarily meet the four Freytag characteristics,146 and
this Note should not be read to suggest that Bandimere demands that all ALJs
will inevitably be found to be inferior officers. Bandimere made clear that a
“case-by-case analysis” approach is necessary—this subsection is meant to
show that, while the duties and discretion of other agencies’ ALJs are by no
means identical to SEC ALJs, they are similar enough to warrant serious
attention. The SEC may be the first agency whose ALJs are found to be inferior officers, but it is likely that, barring a Supreme Court holding to the contrary, they will not be the last.
Judge McKay argued in dissent that the court in Bandimere had done
nothing but create unnecessary constitutional “mischief.”147 To him, the
Bandimere decision “risk[ed] throwing much into disarray.”148
There is nothing mischievous about the court’s holding, however, even
if it does risk upsetting the status quo. Rather, the determination that SEC
ALJs are unconstitutionally appointed must be upheld, in spite of possible
inconvenience or disruption.149 Contrary to Judge McKay’s worries, the
Supreme Court has held that convenience or settled practice cannot outweigh the importance of following what the Constitution demands.150 If
143 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1200 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., dissenting)
(“[The duties of SSA ALJs] should all sound familiar. SSA ALJs have largely the same
duties as SEC ALJs.”).
144 See Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that “FDIC ALJs
perform all of the[ ] functions” of the Freytag STJs). FDIC ALJs are also empowered to take
and rule on evidence. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 308.5(b)(3) (2018); § 308.5(b)(1) (take testimony); §§ 308.5(a), 308.5(b)(5) (conduct trials); §§ 308.25(h), 308.5(b)(4) (compel
discovery).
145 See, e.g., Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1188–89 (Briscoe, J., concurring) (arguing that
courts must engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an ALJ is an inferior
officer or an employee).
146 For example, ALJs of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) do not appear to
have the power to compel discovery. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214, 237 (1978) (finding that § 6 of the National Labor Relations Act (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (2012)) is interpreted to give the National Labor Relations Board, as opposed to the
NLRB ALJs, the discretion to form its own discovery practice); 29 C.F.R. § 102.35 (2018);
see also Bruce A. Miller & Ada A. Verloren, Discovery at the NLRB—Why Not?, 51 WAYNE L.
REV. 107 (2005).
147 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting). Similar to Judge McKay, Judge
Lucero wrote that the Bandimere decision “threaten[ed] to unravel much of our modern
regulatory framework.” Bandimere v. SEC, 855 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
148 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting).
149 Clearly if other agencies’ ALJs are also found to be inferior officers by the courts,
this sentiment likewise applies to those ALJs.
150 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government . . . will not
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other ALJs are determined under Freytag to be inferior officers, then the
proper course of action would be for the relevant agency to have their heads
of department appoint their respective ALJs in accordance with the requirements of the Appointments Clause.151
2. Squaring the Free Enterprise Fund Double For-Cause Removal Problem
with Bandimere
In 2010, the Supreme Court held that the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), a federal entity created by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and placed under SEC oversight,152 violated separation of powers principles because the Board members were insulated by a dual layer of removal
protection.153 The Board members were considered inferior officers154 and
could only be removed from their position by SEC Commissioners on a showing of “good cause.”155 The SEC Commissioners could likewise only be
removed from their positions by the President for good cause.156 The Court
found that this double layer of good-cause removal insulated the Board members from presidential control, and therefore was unconstitutional.157
A finding that SEC ALJs are inferior officers would appear to conflict
with the holding of Free Enterprise Fund. SEC ALJs enjoy life tenure, can only
be removed for good cause,158 and are placed under the oversight of the
Merit Systems Protection Board,159 whose members are likewise only removable for good cause.160 Thus, if SEC ALJs are inferior officers, they would be
in a similar, if not identical situation, as PCAOB Board members in Free Enterprise Fund, subject to a dual layer of good-cause removal protection.
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”). The Court in Chadha rendered almost 200
legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. Id. at 977 (White, J., dissenting). Such a shock
to the status quo was necessary because the “principle of separation of powers was not
simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers.” Id. at 946 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (per curiam)).
151 See Jellum & Tincher, supra note 33, at 34.
152 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484–86
(2010).
153 Id. at 484.
154 See id. at 488. The status of the Board members as inferior officers was not an issue
presented to the Court for consideration.
155 See id. at 486 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2006)).
156 See id. at 487 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be
removed by the President except . . . [for] ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.’” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935))).
157 Id. at 514.
158 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012) (“An action may be taken against an administrative
law judge . . . only for good cause . . . .”); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (2018) (“An administrative
law judge receives a career appointment . . . .”).
159 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012); see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., dissenting).
160 See 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
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The Court in Free Enterprise Fund attempted to distinguish ALJs from the
PCAOB members by limiting the application of the Court’s holding only to
the Board. In one section, the Court argued that none of the positions that
the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund identified as threatened by the Court’s holding were “similarly situated to the Board.”161 Yet, the Court still seemed to
recognize that the Free Enterprise Fund holding could be read to apply more
broadly, and tried to head off such assumptions,162 specifically bracketing off
the question of how Free Enterprise Fund would apply to ALJs:
[O]ur holding also does not address that subset of independent agency
employees who serve as administrative law judges. Whether administrative
law judges are necessarily “Officers of the United States” is disputed. And
unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions, or
possess purely recommendatory powers. The Government . . . refused to
identify either “civil service tenure-protected employees in independent
agencies” or administrative law judges as “precedent for the PCAOB.”163

Free Enterprise Fund was decided before the question of the status of ALJs
had come before the circuit courts. The Court only cited Landry as the
source of the dispute, as the litigation in Lucia and Bandimere had not yet
occurred. The Court referred to ALJs as “employees” in footnote ten
because there had been little to no caselaw even bringing up the issue in the
first place. The Court is not in the business of making broad, sweeping proclamations about categorizing officials when those specific positions are not
before the Court.164 Since, at that time, the general understanding was that
ALJs were employees,165 it would have been extremely unusual for the Court
to identify them as inferior officers. Indeed, Bandimere challenged the generally accepted understanding that SEC ALJs are employees. Footnote ten of
Free Enterprise Fund merely restates that understanding, rather than attempting to settle the issue prematurely. If the Court intended to quash the issue
before it fully developed, there would have been no need to even recognize
the burgeoning dispute in the first place.
161 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 506. ALJs were one of the positions identified by the
dissent that could be affected by the Court’s holding. See id. at 542–43 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
162 Id. at 507 (majority opinion) (“Nothing in our opinion . . . should be read to cast
doubt on the use of what is colloquially known as the civil service system within independent agencies.”).
163 Id. at 507 n.10 (citations omitted) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008))
164 Id. at 507–08 (“There is no reason for us to address whether . . . any [position] not
at issue in this case [is] so structured as to infringe the President’s constitutional authority.”). This mirrors the insistence of the Tenth Circuit only to decide the issue of inferior
officer status as applied to SEC ALJs.
165 Cf. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2408
(2011) (asserting that “[m]any ALJs are inferior officers” before the Lucia and Bandimere
litigation had occurred).
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In dissent, Justice Breyer brought up the ALJ issue and directly questioned how the majority’s holding would impact the status of ALJs.166 Justice
Breyer noted that the Court’s holding would ostensibly apply to ALJs
throughout the administrative state. ALJs are removable for good cause by
the members of the Merit System Protection Board, and the members of this
Board are themselves only removable for cause.167 Therefore, if ALJs are
indeed inferior officers,168 they would appear to run afoul of the Court’s Free
Enterprise Fund holding. Following Free Enterprise Fund to its “logical conclusion” would mean that the “only available remedy to certain double for-cause
problems is to invalidate entire agencies,”169 a result which only the most
zealous anti-administrative activists would welcome.170
Footnote ten of the Court’s opinion therefore becomes of primary
importance, as the Court has explicitly reserved the right to carve out a distinction in its holding for ALJs. The issue, as Justice Breyer pointed out, is
that creating an exception from the double for-cause removal restriction for
ALJs would be completely arbitrary.171 Professor Kevin Stack has argued that
the Free Enterprise Fund decision, rather than reserving the ALJ question for a
later case, actually affirmatively answered the question, establishing that so
long as an inferior officer “perform[s] only adjudicative functions,” the case
“preserves [the officer’s] removal protections.”172 To Professor Stack, ALJs
clearly fall into this adjudicative category,173 and, if the Court adopted this
distinction, it would assuage the concerns of Justice Breyer and Judge McKay
166 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party
before an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against
him is unconstitutional?”).
167 See id. at 542.
168 It is also of note that Justice Breyer argued that ALJs are inferior officers. See id.
(“[A]dministrative law judges . . . ‘are all executive officers.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment))).
169 Id. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Lucia
v. SEC, No. 17-130 (Apr. 23, 2018) (Justice Breyer noting that his squaring of Free Enterprise
Fund with the government’s test for determining who is an inferior officer means “goodbye to the merit civil service at the higher levels and good-bye to independence of ALJs”).
170 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1249–54 (1994). Even Lawson, who argues that the entire “post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional,” id. at 1231, does not suggest throwing out the system as it
presently exists.
171 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Stack, supra note
165, at 2410 (identifying that the critical question for ALJs is “what, in addition to the dual
removal provisions, explains the invalidity of the Board’s removal protection [in Free Enterprise Fund] yet maintains the constitutionality of protections for ALJs”).
172 Stack, supra note 165, at 2413. Professor Kent Barnett has suggested another fix for
the problem Justice Breyer discusses in Free Enterprise Fund, looking not simply to “count[ ]
the tiers” of removal, but at the “nature of the tenure-protection provision[s].” Kent H.
Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1372
(2012).
173 See Stack, supra note 165, at 2411 (noting that the ALJs that the Court referred to in
footnote ten “have only adjudicative functions”).
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by distinguishing ALJs from the PCAOB members at issue in Free Enterprise
Fund.174 Such an understanding of the Court’s opinion in Free Enterprise
Fund would represent an “interesting and important” change in removal
power jurisprudence,175 but if the Court seeks to preserve the employee status of ALJs, who serve as an integral aspect of the administrative state, it may
be a necessary shift.
Although the removal question clearly is relevant to the SEC ALJ issue,
the Court should not address the issue if it takes up the circuit split between
Bandimere and Lucia.176 While footnote ten of Free Enterprise Fund provides
an opportunity for an out to the Court, the Court should only address the
issue before it. This subsection has shown, however, that invoking footnote
ten would create an entirely new problem for the Court—that is, explaining
why officers whose duties are purely adjudicative would not be controlled by
the Free Enterprise Fund holding. Just as the application of Bandimere to other
agencies’ ALJs ought to wait until litigation directly addresses those ALJs, so
too should the double for-cause removal issue wait until it can be squarely
addressed.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will decide whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers
or employees this term.177 The caselaw on point clearly resolves the issue.
The D.C. Circuit incorrectly read into Freytag a requirement that inferior
officers must be able to issue final decisions. In comparison, Bandimere
appropriately resolved the question in finding SEC ALJs to be inferior
officers. Though this may result in a slew of litigation challenging the constitutionality of other agencies’ ALJs and to the application of the Free Enterprise
Fund holding to SEC ALJs, these future concerns should not factor into the
Court’s decision.178
Although it is entirely possible that various other agencies’ ALJs fall into
the inferior officer category, agencies who fear such a result for their respective ALJs have a solution that would resolve any concerns.179 If they fail to
174 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 543 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Bandimere v. SEC, 844
F.3d 1168, 1200 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., dissenting) (“When understood in conjunction with Free Enterprise Fund, I worry today’s opinion will be used to strip ALJs of their dual
layer for-cause protection.”).
175 Stack, supra note 165, at 2412.
176 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (No. 17130) (noting that the issue is “tightly focused” and that the “the constitutionality of ALJ
removal procedures” was never raised in neither Lucia nor Bandimere).
177 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 736.
178 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (“With all the obvious flaws of delay,
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom
than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out
in the Constitution.”).
179 See Jellum & Tincher, supra note 33, at 34 (arguing that the SEC can and should
preemptively appoint ALJs in comportment with the Appointments Clause); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 (Apr. 23, 2018). Here, the federal
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act preemptively, however, these agencies risk having their ALJs found to be
unconstitutional. This is a problem for the agencies to resolve individually,
not the Court. Although this does not mean that the Court should become
willfully blind to the world, neither should the Court be deterred from applying a formal Appointments Clause analysis because of the potential functional ramifications. The Court should refrain from adopting the rationale
of the D.C. Circuit in Lucia, which appeared, in some part, to go to great
lengths to avoid destabilizing the world that ALJs inhabit. Freytag requires
that the Supreme Court find SEC ALJs to be inferior officers.
Although the Appointments Clause is not often invoked, it is not impotent. The Supreme Court has shown time and again that it takes structural
constitutional challenges seriously. When it does so, the Court rarely, if ever,
takes into serious consideration the functional consequences of such a determination.180 There is no reason for the Court to deviate from this practice—
the Appointments Clause demands a specific framework within which
officers of the United States must comport. Though consequences do exist,
the Court should not preemptively address these potential ramifications
when they have not been fully litigated.
There is no doubt that ALJs serve a valued and necessary purpose within
our governmental system. This important role does not excuse a violation of
the Constitution, however. There is no “mischief” in these constitutional
challenges.181 The Constitution demands an ordered system of government,
not that the system be convenient. Even if the solution is a tough pill to
swallow, the remedy remains clear—SEC ALJs must either be appointed by
the head of a department, the President, or a court of law. Until then, they
continue to violate the Appointments Clause.

government argued that the SEC’s ratification of its current ALJs resolved the Appointments Clause issue.
180 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959–60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing
that the Court’s holding “invalidate[d] every use of the legislative veto”); see also Beermann, supra note 28, at 484.
181 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1201 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., dissenting).
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